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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
TORT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS
By L. W. FEEZER*
ASSISTED BY DWIGHT CAMPBELL, JR."
T EN years ago an article by the present writer appeared in the
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW under the title, "Tort Liability of
Manufacturers." '  The purpose of that article was to set forth
briefly the development at that time of the law with reference
to the liability of manufacturers for injuries or damages to per-
sons not in privity of contract with them due to defects in their
products.
The familiar dictum of Winterbottom v. Wright2 and the oft-
repeated exceptions to the doctrine which had been attributed to
that decision were stated. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company
was discussed in some detail, and reference was made to various
rules and formulae which frequently appear in cases dealing with
this problem. Finally an effort was made to discover and present
cases of this type in which the damage suffered by the plaintiff
was in the form of injury to property rather than to the person
and to inquire as to the probable effect of MacPherson v. Buick
*Professor of Law, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, South
Dakota.
tLaw Student, University of South Dakota.
1(1925) 10 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1.
2(1842) 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Exch. 415. It may be well to
remind the reader that this case sustained the defendant's demurrer in an
action brought by the driver of a defective stage coach against the contractor
who supplied it to his employer (the driver's master.) Says Prof. Bohlen:
"The case came up on demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration, which alleged,
as his sole right to recover, his knowledge of and reliance upon this contract
to which he obviously was not a party. But this was overlooked and certain
dicta of Baron Alderson and Lord Abinger were seized upon to torture the
case into an authority for the doctrine that when work is done under a
contract or goods are made and sold, the liability for negligence in per-
formance or manufacture is restricted to those who are parties to the contract
or sale." F. H. Bohlen, (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 633-660.
3(1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050. Ann. Cas. 1916C 440. The
facts of this case are stated briefly by Judge Cardozo in the first sentences
of his opinion in the following words: "The defendant is a manufacturer of
automobiles. It sold an automobile to a retail dealer. The retail dealer
resold it to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was in the car it suddenly
collapsed. One of the wheels was made of defective wood and its spokes
crumbled into fragments. The wheel was not made by the defendant; it was
bought from another manufacturer. There is evidence, however, that its
defects could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection, and the in-
spection was omitted."
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Motor Company on the further developments in this field of law,
particularly in cases of property damage.
It is the present purpose to examine what appear to be some
of the outstanding utterances that might be considered as having
some bearing on the rights and liabilities as between manufacturers
and those who have been occasioned loss by reason of negligently
defective products. It is first to state, in black letter as it were,
the propositions which seemed to be most significant when the
former article was written.
1.-The so-called doctrine of Winterbottoin v. Wright, to wit:
"When work is done under a contract or goods are made and
sold, the liability for negligence in performafice or manufacture
is restricted to those who are parties to the contract or sale."
2.-The following are widely recognized exceptions to the
doctrine of Winter6ottom v. Wright and were the chief reliance
of those cases imposing liability prior to the Buick Motor Comn-
pany Case:
"The first is that an act of negligence of a manufacturer or
vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or health of
mankind and which is committed in the preparation or sale of an
article intended to preserve, destroy or affect human life is action-
able by third persons who suffer from the negligence. . . . The
second exception is that an owner's act of negligence which causes
injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective appliance
upon the owner's premises, may form the basis of an action against
the owner; . . . The third exception to the rule is that one who
sells or delivers an article which he knows to be imminently
dangerous to life or limb to another without notice of its qualities
is liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which
might reasonably have been anticipated, whether there were any
contractual relations between the parties or not."
3.-The rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company :
"A manufacturer owes the affirmative obligation to employ
reasonable care in the manufacture or assembling of chattels which,
while not necessarily dangerous if properly constructed, constitute
a menace to life and limb if not carefully made; and this duty is
owed not only to his immediate vendee but to anyone likely to be
harmed by the defective article while the same is being lawfully
used for the purpose intended."
A more precise statement of what was decided in the Buick
Case, in terms of its own facts, might be: The manufacturer of
4Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1903) 120
Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237. Cf. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co. v. Baridon.
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 26, and see comment in (1935) 19
MiNEsoTA LAW REVIEw 482-3.
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an automobile who purchases wheels from a reputable manufac-
turer is liable to one who purchases a car from a retailer for in-
jury caused by the collapse of a wheel because of defects which
would have been discovered by a reasonable inspection. The writer
suggests that the following statement is a generalization not too
broad to be supported by the decision: The manufacturer of a
product which by reason of negligence in its production is danger-
ous to human safety is liable without privity of contract to one
who suffers bodily injury while the article is being used reasonably
for its intended purpose.
The case has received much attention, not a little of which i
due to the connotation of Judge Cardozo's fine phrase:
"We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life
and limb, when the consequence of negligence may be foreseen,
grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source
of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source
in the law."
This case is also regarded as making clear another point which
had already been recognized in a number of cases, particularly
in New York, but was somewhat hazy and uncertain. This is the
notion that the liability of manufacturers should not be confined
to things which were "inherently" dangerous, viz., designed to
preserve, destroy or affect human life and limb, but should in-
clude those things which are dangerous because of negligence in
connection with their manufacture. In other words, the test is
not whether the article is dangerous when carefully made, but
whether it is likely to cause serious harm if carelessly made. 5
Two problems which come to mind in connection with cases
of this sort are not disposed of by the MacPherson v. Buick Alotor
Company Case:
1.-This case did not settle the question whether a manufac-
turer whose fault was of the sort adumbrated in the statements
of this rule would be liable for property damage unconnected with
personal injury; and,
2.-The statements by Judge Cardozo did not indicate, nor do
they authorize any inference, that the defendant would be liable
for either personal or property damage if the offending chattel
was not, when used for its intended purpose, either inherently
dangerous, or, because of negligent manufacture, dangerous to
humain life and limb.
5See discussion of this point in the former article (1925) 10 MN:INiso'rA
LAw REvIEW 1, 13.
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In surveying the developments in this field of tort liability, it
appears to the writer that the most significant decisions are those
which deal with the question of property damage. The case of
MacPhersoi v. Buick Motor Comnpany was already almost ten
years old at the time of the former article and had become familiar
to most of the courts which had been called upon to pass on this
question during that time; and its doctrine was by that time very
widely accepted. For this reason, what follows will deal largely
with the property damage situation.8
Outstanding as a contribution to the literature of recent years
on our problem is, of course, the Restatement of the Law of Torts
which has been in preparation by the American Law Institute
since 1923, and the first two volumes of which have now been pub-
lished. Chapter fourteen of the Torts Restatement is entitled,
"Liability of Persons Supplying Chattels for the Use of Others."
In dealing with the specific subject of manufacturers we are par-
ticularly concerned with sections 388 to 390, "Rules Applicable to
all Suppliers," and with sections 394 to 398, dealing more speci-
fically with manufacturers. As not all readers of this Rn~viEw
have access to the Restatement, the writer ventures to set out tli
text of a few of these sections. These rules which have been re-
ferred to, with the comment appended by the Reporter antd his
assistants, occupy twenty-seven pages. Each section is printed in
black letter which is followed by the comment and in some case;
by illustrative statements of facts with the Reporter's conclusion
as to whether or not there would be liability in the given situation.
Section 388, entitled, "Chattels Known to be Dangerous for
Intended Use," reads as follows:
"One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for another to use, is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other
or to be in the vicinity of its probable use, for bodily harm caused
by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person
for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
a) knows, or from facts known to him should realize, that the
chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is
6In the periodicals during the last ten years there have been many notes
dealing with tort liability for defective products. However, there has been
little attention paid to the question of property damage as distinguished
from personal injury, and perhaps even less note has been taken of the
offending chattel's threat to property as contrasted with its potential danger
to persons. The most extensive notes on the property damage cases are
(1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 264; (1930) 14 MIxxNSOTA LAw REvIEw 306; and
(1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 482.
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supplied;
b) and has no reason to believe that those for whose use the
chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition; and
c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be so."
Just what all this means when reduced to language forms with
which lawyers are familiar at first seems a little puzzling to the
writer; nor have the illustrations and comment furnished a key.
In fact, reading through the entire chapter, to quote Dean Leon
Green's recent comment in the Illinois Law Review on another
chapter of the Torts Restatement, "will leave the reader with a
decided feeling of dizziness."'7
A case with which the writer is familiar is suggested as prob-
ably illustrating a situation to which this rule might be applied.
In that case, Farley v. Edward E. Tower Coinpany,8 it was held
that it was properly left to the jury whether the vendor and manu-
facturer (either or both) of celluloid combs for use in water-
waving by a hair dresser using heat in the process would be liable
to a customer who was burned when the combs took fire. The
combs were not indicated to the hair-dresser as being inflammable.
The hair-dresser was exonerated by the jury, but a verdict against
the dealer from whom he bought them and also against the manu-
facturer was allowed to stand.
Passing to section 389 we find a rule as to the liability of manu-
facturers or others furnishing chattels to another which are in-
capable of safe use. At the risk of discouraging the reader from
continuing, this section is also quoted at length:
"One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for another's use knowing that the chattel is unlikely to be made
reasonably safe before being put to a use to which the supplier
should expect it to be put, is subject to liability for bodily harm
caused by such use to those whom the supplier should expect to
use the chattel or be in the vicinity of its probable use and who
are ignorant of the dangerous character of the chattel or whose
knowledge thereof does not make them contributorily negligent,
although the supplier had informed the other for whose use the
chattel is supplied of its dangerous character."
The illustration given for the application of this rule is as follows:
"A employs B, a building contractor, to build a row of houses
according to plans and specifications supplied by A. These plans
require material and workmanship so cheap and inferior that any
7(1935) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 583-593.
8(1930) 271 Mass. 230, 171 N. E. 639.
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competent builder would realize that a house built thereunder
might collapse at any time. B builds the houses under these plans
and specifications. One of the houses collapses and harms C, a
possible purchaser, inspecting the house at A's invitation, and D,
a traveller upon the adjoining highway. B is liable to C and to D."
As Dean Green points out in the article previously referred to, the
decisions in similar cases are contra, and this cannot be sustained
even as good class room law.9 He adds, "This is not the same
situation as an automobile." Mr. Green evidently intends to
imply what the average reader of this chapter taken as a whole is
not unlikely to infer, namely, that the draftsmen of these sections
had at least in the back of their minds the cases arising out of
defective autos and perhaps firearms and explosives and other
things of the sort described in some of the earlier cases as "in-
tended to preserve, deftroy or affect human life."
Section 390 in effect says that one who puts a dangerous in-
strumentality into the hands of an incompetent will be liable for
the harm ensuing. It reads:
"One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for the use of another whom the supplier knows or from facts
known to him should know to be likely because of his youth, in-
experience or. otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreason-
able risk of bodily harm to himself and others whom the supplier
should expect to share in, or be in the vicinity of, its use, is sub-
ject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby to them."
Passing to section 394 we find that a manufacturer is one of
the suppliers who may be liable under the preceding sections.
Section 395 deals with the peculiar duty of manufacturers to
users of -their products with which this paper deals primarily.
The section reads:
"A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the
manufacturer of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should
recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing substan-
tial bodily harm to those who lawfully use it for a purpose for
which it-is manufactured and to those whom the supplier should
expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to liability
for bodily harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and
for a purpose for which it is manufactured." 10
The only illustration given for this section is stated:
"The A Motor Company incorporates in its car wheels manu-
factured by the B Wheel Company. These wheels are constructed
of defective material, as an inspection made by the A company
9(1935) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 583. See note 21, page 599.01talics ours.
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before putting them on its car would have disclosed. The defec-
tive character of the wheel, however, is not readily discoverable
after the wheel is installed. The car is sold to C through the D
Company, an independent distributor. While C is driving the car
the defective wheel collapses causing the car to swerve and collide
with that of E, causing harm to C, E, F, and G, who are guests
in the cars of C and E respectively. The A Motor Company is
liable to C, E, F and G."
Three points seem to the writer to deserve notice in comparing
this intendedly authoritative statement of the law, as it ought to be.
with the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, viz:
1.-The "ambit of liability," to use the phrase employed in the
comment of the reporter in the published text of the Restatement.
is made to include "those whom the suppliers should expect to be
in the vicinity of its probable use.""
2-The rule is made to apply only to things involving "an un-
reasonable risk of causing substantial bodily harm."
3-The liability imposed by this section is only for bodily harm
-and nowhere else is liability for property damage provided for,
nor does the comment on this section directly or indirectly refer
to the problem of property damage.
It is not proposed herein to make an extended study of the
cases since the article of 1925. It will serve the purpose to say
that the principle of MlacPherson v. Buick Motor Company has
been widely accepted and followed in many jurisdictions in this
country; and that, in the more recent opinions, not much is said
about Winterbottom v. 1,J'right and its three exceptions. There is
also some disposition to invoke principles of warranty and sales
especially with reference to food products.' But an examination
of the most recent cases which the writer has been able to find
dealing with manufacturers' liability for negligently defective
112 Restatement, Torts, page 751.
This was one of the questions raised in my former article on this topic.
viz.. whether the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. would be regarded
in future as including others than the owner or direct user of the thing.
This is illustrated by the case of Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Co., (1923)
182 Wis. 941, 195 N. W. 388. The plaintiffs here included both the owner
of a defective campstove which exploded and his mother-in-law who was
assisting in preparing supper upon it. ,The owner suffered personal and
property damage, and the mother-in-law suffered personal injury. (It might
be added that the owner's claim for property damage was based not upon
the damage to his mother-in-law but upon the fact that his tent burned.)
12Hertzler v. Manshum, (1924) 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155; Ward
Baking Co. v. Trizzino, (1928) 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557; Cohen v.
Dugan Bros., (1928) 132 Misc. Rep. 896. 230 N. Y. S. 742; Turner v.
Edison Storage Battery Co., (1928) 248 N. Y. 73, 161 N. E. 423.
TORT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS
products seem not to favor the warranty concept as a basis of
liability.
As the earlier paper sought to emphasize the logic of extend-
ing manufacturer's liability to include property damage, it is
especially pertinent to consider what have been the developments
in this direction. It has already been pointed out that the Restate-
ment has not mentioned property damage; nor does it refer to
injury due to chattels which are dangerous (when used as in-
tended) only to property. What of the case law? A few cases
were examined in the earlier article. The most notable was
Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Company" in which the South
Dakota supreme court overruled a demurrer to a complaint againt
the manufacturer of hog cholera serum by a plaintiff whose hogs
died following its use. The complaint charged negligent mann-
facture and the presence of impurities. The striking feature of
the case is that the court seemed to take for granted manufacturer's
liability for property damage and said not a word to indicate that
such a view was unique. The cases since are few, but of the new
ones discovered all seem to recognize a right of action for prop-
erty damage, and the only uncertainty seems to be whether thi.,
liability is limited to cases where the harm is caused by a thing
dangerous to personal safety or applies likewise to a product which
(always being used for its intended purpose) is likely to cause
only property damage and not personal injury. The four most
outstanding cases are worth noting in some detail. Two of these
cases concern products dangerous to human safety; the products
in the other two are not likely to endanger life and limb. They
are so classified.
.-PRODUCT NOT DANGEROUS To HUMAN SAFETY:
A.-Pine Grove Poultry Farm v. Newto-wn By-Products Ifanu-
facturing Company.14  The defendant sold meat scraps to the
plaintiff to be used as food for ducks. The ducks were killed due
to fine steel wire in the meat scraps. There was a statute making
it negligence as a matter of law to sell meat scraps containing
anything harmful to animals. On this basis the defendant was
held liable, and it was said by the New York Court of Appeals to
be unnecessary to consider whether the principle of MacPherson v.
13(1921) 44 S. D. 421, 184 N. V. 252. Contra, Windramn Mfg. Co. v.
Boston Blacking Co., (1921) 239 Mass. 123, 131 N. E. 454: Tompkins v.
Quaker Oats Co., (1921) 239 Mass. 147, 131 N. E. 456.
14(1928) 249 N. Y. 293, 162 N. F 84.
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Buick should be extended to include damage to property rights as
well as personal injuries.
B.-Ellis v. Lindmark. 5 A, a wholesale druggist, contracted
to sell a barrel of cod liver oil to B, a retail druggist. A knew
that the oil was to be resold to subvendees who were to use it to
feed to their chickens. Instead of delivering cod liver oil, A de-
livered a barrel of linseed oil, some of which B resold to C. C fed
it to his chickens, and many of them died, whereupon C sued both
A and B for the damage to his poultry. After upholding the ver-
dict of the jury that both A and B were negligent, and that the
damage was caused by their negligence, the court held that 1)
may recover from both A and B.
2.-PRODUCT DANGEROUS TO HUMAN SAFETY:
A.-AMarsh Wood Products Company z,. Babcock and II'il-
cox.16 The defendant sold the plaintiff a number of boiler tubes.
some of which had been manufactured from defective steel. A
tube exploded and injured a co-plaintiff employee as well as the
plaintiff's real property. There was a judgment for the plaintiffs
permitting a recovery in each case, and, upon a writ of error, it
was held that a manufacturer may be liable though the purchaser
may be expected to make new tests before putting the article into
permanent use, and that manufacturer's liability is to be extended
to cover property damage proximately resulting from the negli-
gence of the defendant.
B.-Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n. v. L. Sonne-
born & Sons, Inc.1 7 The defendant was the manufacturer of a
waterproofing substance known as "Hydrocide No. 889." A local
contractor, to whose right of litigation the plaintiff succeeds, used
the preparation to waterproof the inside of a farmer's silo. The
employee of the contractor used an ordinary farm lantern for
illumination. Fumes from the Hydrocide No. 889 were exploded
by the flames of the lantern, and the resulting fire destroyed the
newly-built silo, a barn and other property. There had been no
warning of the dangerous consequences of using the preparation
in conjunction with an open flame. The New York court held
the manufacturer liable to the owner of the property upon which
the hydrocide was being applied, using the following language:
15(1929) 177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395. See (1930) 14 MINNESOTA
LAw REvIEw 306.
16(1932) 207 Wis. 209, 240 N. W. 392.
17(1934) 263 N. Y. 463, 189 N. E. 551.
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"As hydrocide No. 889 manufactured by the defendant, was a
secret, highly explosive preparation, imminently dangerous to life
and property, sold without warning of its dangerous nature, in-
tended to be used in the condition it was in when delivered and for
the purpose for which it was recommended in a way that should
reasonably have been anticipated, we believe that the defendant
manufacturer is legally responsible for the damage to property
which resulted.. . . We confine our decision to cases in which the
product is imminently dangerous to life and property."
There is also an English case of significance on this point.
It is McAlister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson,/ in which the manu-
facturer of a bottle of ginger beer containing a decomposed snail
was held liable for the illness of the consumer for whom it was
purchased by a friend in a caf6 which served it to the plaintiff.
The majority opinion in the House of Lords announced,
"By Scotch and English law alike the manufacturer of an
article of food or medicine sold by him to distributors in circum-
stances which prevent the distributor or the ultimate purchaser
from discovering by inspection any defect, is under a legal duty
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take reasonable care
that the article is free from defect likely to cause injury to
health."' 9
A strong dissenting opinion, however, holds that the case is gov-
erned by Winterbottom v. Wright. The writer of the majority
opinion remarks that this rule is a proposition which he ventures
no one in England or Scotland who was not a lawyer would for
one moment doubt. While this case does not involve property
damage, nor a chattel or substance not imminently dangerous to
health, the whole language shows a tendency toward a liberal theory
of manufacturer's responsibility.
In short, the case law which we have on this point has already
gone beyond the Restatement in New York, where the Restate-
ment rule evidently had its source, in that: firstly, property dam-
age may be a basis of manufacturer's liability where the offend-
ing product is dangerous to human safety, as well as in all the
other jurisdictions where the problem has arisen; and secondly,
in those cases where the article was not dangerous to human life,
the defendant was held liable notwithstanding-viz., in Minnesota,
in South Dakota and in the eighth circuit, and in New York the
same result was reached by statute.
The most significant thing about *all this is that on this point
18[1932] A. C. 562, 101 L. J. P. C. 119, 147 L T. 281.
19 See opinion of Lord Atkin, at page 599.
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the Restatement was left behind by the forward progress of the
common law while its creators were formulating it, and when pub-
lished it no longer stated the law of the jurisdiction from whose
decision was derived the outline skeleton for the rule as finally
incorporated. May not one wonder, perhaps hope, that this will
be the sorry fate of many of the rules which the Institute has
labored so hard to formulate? However effectual the Restatement
may be in some branches of the law, it would seem unwise as well
as impossible to attempt to make static so fluctuating a thing as the
law of torts.
It is an interesting coincidence that Judge John B. Sanborn.
who wrote the opinion in E. I. Du Pont De Nemnours and Co. v.
Baridon,2 0 which goes furthest beyond the Restatement and which
expressly disapproves Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine
Co.," long an authority, is a nephew of Judge Walter Sanborn,
who wrote the opinion in the Huset Case. The coincidence is a
valuable example of the truth of the quotation with which the
former article began and which we shall use to close this one-
"The law is progressive and expanding, adapting itself to the new
relations and interests which are constantly springing up in the
progress of society. '
-22
2 0 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 26, discussed in (1935) 19 MiNNF.-
SOTA LAw REVIEw 482.2 1 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1903) 120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237, 51 L. R. A. 303.22Green, C. J., in Hadger v. New England Scrcw Co., (1850) 1 R. I.
340-356.
